

Message Text

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ACTION EUR-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 CIAE-00 PM-07 INR-10 L-03 NSAE-00 PA-04

RSC-01 PRS-01 SP-03 USIA-15 TRSE-00 SAJ-01 NSC-07

SS-20 ACDA-19 IO-14 AEC-11 OMB-01 SAM-01 NEA-14 DRC-01

H-03 SCI-06 NSF-04 FEA-02 EB-11 COME-00 /185 W
----- 088962

P 090940Z MAY 74
FM USMISSION NATO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5555
SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 2 USNATO 2518

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR, NATO
SUBJ: NORTH ATLANTIC ASSEMBLY: RESOLUTION ON REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE
OF NINE

REF: STATE 088712

1. HERewith SYG DRAFT COMMENTS ON THE REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE OF
NINE. THESE COMMENTS WILL BE DISCUSSED IN THE COUNCIL ON 14
MAY. ACTION REQUESTED: DEPARTMENT COMMENTS BY OOB 13 MAY.

2. BEGIN TEXT:

PO/74/53

PROPOSED COMMENTS ON THE REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE OF NINE

IT WAS WITH THE GREATEST INTEREST THAT I READ THE
REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE OF NINE, WHICH WAS ADOPTED BY THE NORTH
ATLANTIC ASSEMBLY AT ITS 1973 SESSION. THE AUTHORS OF THIS VERY
COMPREHENSIVE REPORT, WHICH PROVIDES A VALUABLE SUMMARY OF THE
VARIOUS VIEWS OF THE ROLE OF THE ALLIANCE AND ITS FUTURE, DESERVE
THE WARMEST PRAISE FOR THEIR WORK.
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THE REPORT WILL CERTAINLY OFFER FOOD FOR THOUGHT FOR ALL
WHO HAVE RESPONSIBILITIES WITHIN THE ALLIANCE. WHILE EMPHASIZING
MY AGREEMENT WITH THE GENERAL TREND OF THE REPORT AND WITH THE
PRINCIPAL IDEAS FORMULATED THEREIN, I SHOULD LIKE TO DRAW THE

ASSEMBLY'S ATTENTION TO CERTAIN POINTS WHICH I THINK DESERVE SPECIAL MENTION.

AS REGARDS THE POLITICAL SPHERE, THE AUTHORS OF THE REPORT ARE RIGHT TO STRESS THAT EVERY EFFORT SHOULD BE MADE TO PREVENT EAST-WEST DETENTE FROM LEADING TO A WEAKENING OF THE ALLIANCE'S RESOLVE TO PROVIDE FOR ITS OWN SECURITY AND TO UNDERLINE THE NEED FOR CLOSE POLITICAL CO-ORDINATION IN THIS FIELD. I NOTE THE COMMITTEE'S WARNING ABOUT THE DANGER OF DIFFERENCES BETWEEN EUROPE AND NORTH AMERICA DEVELOPING TO THE POINT WHERE THEY COULD WEAKEN THE COHESION OF THE ALLIANCE. OBVIOUSLY, UNDER OUR DEMOCRATIC AND LIBERAL SYSTEM EACH MEMBER COUNTRY IS PERFECTLY FREE TO PURSUE ITS OWN POLICY, BUT THE FACT REMAINS THAT THE DEFENCE OF THESE DEMOCRATIC VALUES, WHICH IS THE RAISON D'ETRE OF OUR ALLIANCE, DEMANDS THE PRESERVATION OF A SPIRIT OF SOLIDARITY AT ALL TIMES WITH REGARD TO OUR BASIC PURPOSE. IT IS BECAUSE I FEEL SURE THAT ALL MEMBER COUNTRIES SUBSCRIBE UNREASERVEDLY TO THIS PRINCIPLE, THAT I FIND THE VIEWS EXPRESSED IN PARAGRAPH 7 OF CHAPTER 1 RATHER PESSIMISTIC. I AM EQUALLY SURE THAT THE MEMBERS OF THE ALLIANCE ARE DETERMINED NOT TO LET THE ECONOMIC PROBLEMS REFERRED TO IN PARAGRAPH 8 INTERFERE WITH THE UNITY OF THE ALLIANCE.

I NOTED WITH PARTICULAR INTEREST THE EMPHASIS GIVEN IN THE SECOND CHAPTER OF THE REPORT TO NATO'S ROLE IN THE FIELD OF SECURITY. THIS, OF COURSE, IS THE FUNDAMENTAL AND POLITICAL ESSENCE OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY WHICH GIVES RECOGNITION TO THE FACT THAT SECURITY IS THE NECESSARY PREMISE WITHOUT WHICH ALL OTHER FORMS OF CO-OPERATION BETWEEN THE ALLIES, AS WELL AS BETWEEN THE MEMBERS OF THE ALLIANCE AND OTHER GROUPINGS OF COUNTRIES IN POLITICAL, ECONOMIC AND SCIENTIFIC MATTERS, COULD NOT BE SUCCESSFULLY PURSUED.

THE REPORT RIGHTLY POINTS OUT THAT SINCE THE FOUNDING OF NATO, THE GEO-ECONOMIC AND THE GEO-STRATEGIC BALANCE HAS CHANGED AS HAS CHANGED THE BALANCE OF MILITARY FORCES AVAILABLE
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TO NATO AND THE WARSAW PACT. SUCH CHANGES HAVE NATURALLY A BEARING ON NATO'S DEFENSIVE POSTURE AND IN WELCOMING THE SUPPORT THE REPORT GIVES FOR THE MAINTENANCE OF CERTAIN FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES, LIKE THE CONTINUING NEED FOR COLLECTIVE DEFENCE AND A UNITED STATES PRESENCE IN EUROPE, I AM ALSO VERY GRATEFUL FOR THE INTERESTING IDEAS PUT FORWARD FOR COPING WITH THE RE-ADAPTATION OF CERTAIN ASPECTS OF NATO'S POLICIES AND POSTURE TO THE NEW SITUATION NOW EXTANT.

WHILST IT IS QUITE TRUE THAT THE ACHIEVEMENT OF NUCLEAR PARITY BY THE USSR IS A MATTER OF THE HIGHEST IMPORTANCE, I DO NOT THINK THAT THIS NECESSARILY IMPLIES THAT THE STRATEGY OF FLEXIBLE RESPONSE NEED BE REVIEWED. WE CONSIDER THAT THE STRATEGY AS SUCH IS STILL FUNDAMENTALLY VALID; INDEED ANY

ALTERNATIVE WHICH WOULD IMPLY A RETURN TO THE TRIPWIRE CONCEPT IS UNREALISTIC AND UNACCEPTABLE. NATO DOES HOWEVER HOLD UNDER CONSTANT REVIEW THE WAYS AND MEANS BY WHICH THE STRATEGY SHOULD BE IMPLEMENTED.

THERE ARE THREE PASSAGES IN THIS SECTION ON WHICH I SHOULD LIKE TO COMMENT IN PARTICULAR.

IT IS PROBABLY TRUE THAT NATO HAS GIVEN MORE THOUGHT TO THE OVERALL APPROACH TO THE MBFR NEGOTIATIONS THAN TO THE DETAILED STRUCTURE OF THE MILITARY FORCES WHICH SHOULD THEN EMERGE AS A RESULT OF SUCH NEGOTIATIONS. IT IS, OF COURSE, DIFFICULT TO FORECAST THE RESULTS OF NEGOTIATIONS WHICH HAVE SCARCELY BEGUN, BUT THERE ARE BOUND TO BE CONSEQUENCES FOR NATO IN THE FIELD OF FORCE STRUCTURE, DEPLOYMENTS, REINFORCEMENT PLANS ETC., WHEN WE COME TO THE SECOND PHASE OF NEGOTIATIONS WHICH ARE EXPECTED TO FOCUS ON NON-UNITED STATES AND NON-SOVIET FORCES.

WHILE WE CANNOT KNOW WHAT THE FINAL OUTCOME OF THE MBFR NEGOTIATIONS WOULD BE, IT IS CONCEIVABLE THAT CERTAIN SIDE EFFECTS OF MBFR COULD AFFECT THE NUCLEAR SUPPORT OF ALLIED COMMAND EUROPE. IT WILL BE DESIRABLE TO THINK ALL THESE PROBLEMS THROUGH ON AN ALLIANCE-WIDE BASIS WELL IN ADVANCE.

SECONDLY AND SOMEWHAT AMBIGUOUSLY, PARAGRAPH 11 SEEMS TO PROPOSE A WEST EUROPEAN ORGANIZATION FOR THE COMMON
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DEVELOPMENT AND PROCUREMENT OF ARMAMENTS.

FROM THE ALLIANCE POINT OF VIEW, AN INCREASE IN INTRA-EUROPEAN DEFENCE CO-OPERATION IS ESSENTIAL AND COMMON DEVELOPMENT AND PROCUREMENT OF ARMAMENTS COULD HAVE A USEFUL EFFECT IN RATIONALIZING THE PRODUCTION IN WESTERN EUROPE OF MANY CATEGORIES OF WEAPONS AND IN LOWERING THE COSTS FOR MILITARY FORCES. ALL EFFORTS, HOWEVER, SHOULD BE MADE TO AVOID THE RISK THAT CO-OPERATION AMONG EUROPEAN NATIONS ON ARMAMENTS MIGHT LEAD TO THE DEVELOPMENT OF TWO INCOMPATIBLE SETS OF STANDARDS, ONE EUROPEAN AND ONE NORTH AMERICAN. IT IS OF CRUCIAL IMPORTANCE THAT THE FORCES OF THE WHOLE ALLIANCE BE ABLE TO OPERATE EFFECTIVELY, AND IT IS PARTICULARLY IMPORTANT THE REINFORCEMENTS FROM NORTH AMERICA SHALL BE ABLE TO OPERATE WITH INDIGENOUS EUROPEAN FORCES. ALLIANCE-WIDE COMMONALITY OF EQUIPMENT IS THE BEST WAY TO ASSURE THIS CAPABILITY. MOREOVER, THE ABILITY TO SUPPORT ONE ANOTHER'S FORCES LOGISTICALLY SHARING MUNITIONS, SPARE PARTS OR MAINTENANCE AS NECESSARY, OFFERS BOTH A MAJOR ADVANTAGE IN MILITARY FLEXIBILITY AND A PEACETIME ECONOMIC ADVANTAGE.

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NEA-14 SCI-06 NSF-04 FEA-02 EB-11 COME-00 H-03 /185 W

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 2 OF 2 USNATO 2518

IT IS OF CONSIDERABLE STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE THAT A MORE EFFICIENT EUROPEAN ARMAMENTS INDUSTRY BE DEVELOPED. AT THE SAME TIME, WE MUST ACHIEVE GREATER COMMONALITY OF ARMAMENTS THROUGHOUT THE INVENTORIES OF THE WHOLE ALLIANCE. TO SERVE BOTH GOALS WE MUST ACHIEVE GREATER INTERDEPENDENCE FOR DEVELOPMENT AND GREATER CROSS-LICENSING FOR PRODUCTION ACROSS THE ATLANTIC. THAT THIS CAN BE A TWO-WAY STREET, AS IT MUST, IS EVIDENCED BY RECENT US DECISIONS TO ACQUIRE EUROPEAN-DESIGNED WEAPONS (E.G. SHORT-RANGE AIR DEFENCE MISSILES) WHICH WILL BE PRODUCED IN THE US UNDER LICENCE. ON THE OTHER HAND, IT SHOULD NOT BE EXCLUDED THAT IN CERTAIN CASES SPECIFIC TYPES OF WEAPONS COULD BE DESIGNED AND PRODUCED ON AN EUROPEAN-WIDE BASIS FOR TAKING INTO ACCOUNT LOCAL REQUIREMENTS, CLIMATIC CONDITIONS, ETC..

WITH REGARD TO THE FOLLOW-UP ACTION CONCERNING PARAGRAPH 11 AND THE POSSIBLE ROLES OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC ASSEMBLY IN THIS RESPECT, IT IS RECOMMENDED THAT THE NORTH ATLANTIC ASSEMBLY COULD UNDERTAKE A STUDY OF THE IMPEDIMENTS TO GREATER CROSS-ATLANTIC INTERDEPENDENCE IN DEVELOPMENT AND CROSS-LICENSING FOR PRODUCTION, AND OF THE POLICY CHANGES (NATIONAL OR ALLIANCE) NEEDED TO FACILITATE SUCH INTERDEPENDENCE. I BELIEVE THIS IS A PROPER SUBJECT FOR STUDY BY PARLIAMENTARIANS AND COULD PROVE CONSTRUCTIVE. THIS ISSUE IS IMPORTANT BECAUSE CONFIDENTIAL

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IT IS THE KEY TO SUCCESSFUL ACHIEVEMENT OF BOTH THE GOAL OF A MORE EFFICIENT EUROPEAN ARMAMENTS EFFORT AND THE GOAL OF ALLIANCE-WIDE COMMONALITY.

MY THIRD COMMENTT RELATES TO THE SUGGESTION IN PARAGRAPH 12 THAT WESTERN EUROPE SHOULD BECOME AN EQUAL PARTNER WITH THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA IN NATO; THAT THERE SHOULD

BE AN INCREASE IN WESTERN EUROPEAN MILITARY RELIANCE; AND THAT THERE SHOULD BE A DEVOLUTION OF CERTAIN DEFENCE RESPONSIBILITIES FROM THE US TO WESTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES OR TO INSTITUTIONS DEVELOPED BY THEM. I ENTIRELY AGREE THAT THE PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES AND THE PROSPECTS FOR EUROPE IN THE FUTURE DEMAND THAT THE EUROPEAN NATIONS SHOULD MAKE A GREATER CONTRIBUTION TO THE SECURITY OF THE ALLIANCE THAN THEY DO NOW. BUT IN A NUCLEAR AGE, IS IT REALISTIC TO EXPECT THAT WITHIN THIS CENTURY, WESTERN EUROPE WILL BE ABLE TO ATTAIN MILITARY SELF-SUFFICIENCY OR THE MILITARY POWER EQUIVALENT TO THAT WHICH THE US POSSESSES TODAY? CERTAINLY THIS CANNOT BE OBTAINED BY INSTITUTIONAL MEANS ALONE NOR WITHOUT A REAL SUBSTANTIAL INCREASE IN THE DEFENCE EFFORTS OF EUROPEAN NATIONS. SURELY FOR THE FORESEEABLE FUTURE, WESTERN EUROPE MUST CONTINUE TO RELY FOR ITS SECURITY ON ITS LINK WITH ITS NORTH AMERICAN ALLIES. ON THE OTHER HAND, ITS OWN SELF-RESPECT AND CONFIDENCE IN ITS FUTURE DEMANDS THAT EUROPE'S CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE ALLIANCE SHOULD INCREASE.

AS A LAST COMMENT ON THE NEED TO RE-ADAPT CERTAIN ASPECTS RELATED TO THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CURRENT STRATEGY I WOULD MENTION THAT I ATTACH PARTICULAR IMPORTANCE TO STUDYING THE IMPLICATIONS OF DETERRENCE AT SEA AND BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF THE ROLE OF NATO'S NAVAL FORCES.

THE CHAPTER ON ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION WAS DRAFTED BEFORE THE OUTBREAK OF THE OIL CRISIS. GENERALLY SPEAKING, THE WORST FEARS OF THE COMMITTEE OF NINE HAVE BEEN EXCEEDED AND THE IMPORTANCE OF THE PROBLEMS TO BE SOLVED MAKES THE CO-ORDINATION OF NATIONAL POLICIES MORE THAN EVER NECESSARY.

WITHOUT GOING AT LENGTH INTO THE ECONOMIC CONSIDERATIONS DEALT WITH SO APTLY IN THE REPORT, I OUGHT TO POINT OUT THAT IT IS IN THE ECONOMIC SPHERE THAT THE ALLIANCE IS PERHAPS MOST VULNERABLE TODAY, BOTH AS REGARDS EXTERNAL
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PRESSURES AND INTERNAL COHESION. THE STATEMENT APPEARING AT THE BEGINNING OF THIS CHAPTER, "THE TIME HAS LONG SINCE PASSED WHEN ANY ONE STATE CAN ACT ON ITS OWN IN ECONOMIC MATTERS", IS TRUER TODAY THAN IT EVER WAS.

ALTHOUGH NATO IS NOT EQUIPPED TO SOLVE THESE ECONOMIC PROBLEMS, IT IS INCUMBENT ON THE ALLIANCE, BY VIRTUE OF ARTICLE 2 OF THE TREATY, TO STIMULATE THE POLITICAL WILL TO TACKLE THEM.

IT IS IN THIS CONTEXT THAT I NOTE THAT THE REPORT REFERS TO THE IMPORTANCE OF NON-MILITARY SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNOLOGICAL CO-OPERATION WITHIN THE ALLIANCE, ESPECIALLY WITH REGARD TO ENERGY NEEDS AND ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION.

WELL BEFORE THE ONSET OF THE ENERGY CRISIS IN LATE 1973

AND THE CONVENING OF THE UNITED NATIONS' CONFERENCE ON THE HUMAN ENVIRONMENT IN JUNE 1972, NATO'S SCIENCE COMMITTEE AND COMMITTEE ON THE CHALLENGES OF MODERN SOCIETY (CCMS) HAD BEGUN TO TACKLE THESE TWO PROBLEM AREAS. BUILDING ON THE EXPERIENCE OF THE SCIENCE PROGRAMME INITIATED IN 1958, IN WHICH MORE THAN 50,000 SENIOR SCIENTISTS HAVE PARTICIPATED, AND ON THE MORE RECENT ACTIVITIES OF THE CCMS, THE ALLIANCE HAS TAKEN IMPORTANT INITIATIVES IN THESE TWO FIELDS.

I AM SURE YOU ARE AWARE THAT THE NATO SCIENCE COMMITTEE HAS TACKLED THE SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNOLOGICAL ASPECTS OF ENERGY CONSUMPTION, NOTABLY THROUGH THE RECENT PUBLICATION OF A REPORT, TECHNOLOGY OF EFFICIENT ENERGY UTILIZATION, WHICH HAS ALREADY CATALYZED NATIONAL ACTION.

THE RECENT ENERGY CRISIS HAS ENHANCED THE RELEVANCY OF TWO NEW CCMS PILOT STUDIES IN SOLAR AND GEOTHERMAL ENERGY, AND FURTHER ENERGY CONSERVATION STUDIES ARE NOW BEING PROPOSED.

NOT ONLY ARE THESE INITIATIVES IN THE SPIRIT OF ARTICLE 2 OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY, BUT THEY ARE ALSO PERTINENT TO THE RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE 1956 REPORT OF THE THREE WISE MEN. FURTHERMORE, THEY PROVIDE TESTED MEANS FOR THE ALLIANCE TO TAKE A WIDER VIEW OF FUTURE REQUIREMENTS, INCLUDING THE ACCESSIBILITY OF CRITICAL MATERIALS AND THEIR USE, THE NEED

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FOR MORE EFFECTIVE AND SOPHISTICATED COMMUNICATIONS, THE CRITICAL IMPORTANCE OF CONTINUING FOOD SUPPLIES, AND MANY OTHER VITAL ISSUES WHICH WILL REQUIRE NATO-WIDE COLLABORATION FOR THEIR RESOLUTION.

THE REPORT EMPHASIZES THAT PROGRESS TOWARDS EUROPEAN UNITY SHOULD PROVE A POSITIVE FACTOR FOR THE ALLIANCE; A UNITED EUROPE COULD MAKE A GREATER CONTRIBUTION TO THE POLITICAL AND MILITARY STRENGTH OF THE ALLIANCE. THE VIEWS EXPRESSED BY THE COMMITTEE OF NINE ARE IN LINE WITH THE THINKING BEHIND THE COUNCIL'S WORK ON ATLANTIC RELATIONS.

THE AIMS WHICH THE REPORT SAYS SHOULD BE PURSUED BY THE COUNTRIES OF THE ALLIANCE AT THE CSCE NEGOTIATIONS ARE, IN FACT, THOSE WHICH ALLIED COUNTRIES'S DELEGATIONS IN GENEVA ARE ALREADY SEEKING TO ACHIEVE.

LASTLY, I SHOULD LIKE TO RECORD THAT I SHARE THE WISH EXPRESSED BY THE COMMITTEE OF NINE THAT THE NORTH ATLANTIC ASSEMBLY SHOULD EXTEND ITS ACTIVITIES TO INTERPARLIAMENTARY CO-OPERATION BETWEEN EUROPE AND THE UNITED STATES IN A WIDE VARIETY OF FIELDS. THE PURSUIT OF THIS AIM WILL UNDOUBTEDLY HIGHLIGHT THE ADVANTAGES OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC ASSEMBLY'S PRESENT POSITION IN RELATION TO THE BODIES OF THE ALLIANCE. THIS POSITION, WHICH IS NOT GOVERNED BY ANY ORGANIC TEXTS, ENABLES THE ASSEMBLY TO MAINTAIN EXCELLENT

RELATIONS WITH THE SECRETARY GENERAL, AND CLOSE CO-OPERATION WITH
THE INTERNATIONAL STAFF, WHILE AT THE SAME TIME AFFORDING IT THE
GREATEST POSSIBLE FREEDOM OF ACTION.
END TEXT.CAULIFFE

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Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: X
Capture Date: 11 JUN 1999
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: n/a
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 09 MAY 1974
Decaption Date: 01 JAN 1960
Decaption Note:
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Authority: garlanwa
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 28 MAY 2004
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1974ATO02518
Document Source: ADS
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: 11652 GDS
Errors: n/a
Film Number: n/a
From: NATO
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1974/newtext/t19740587/abbryutu.tel
Line Count: 330
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE
Office: n/a
Original Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Original Handling Restrictions: n/a
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 7
Previous Channel Indicators:
Previous Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Reference: STATE 088712
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Authority: garlanwa
Review Comment: n/a
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 09 APR 2002
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review History: RELEASED <09 APR 2002 by shawdg>; APPROVED <06-Sep-2002 by garlanwa>
Review Markings:

Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
30 JUN 2005

Review Media Identifier:
Review Referrals: n/a
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: NORTH ATLANTIC ASSEMBLY: RESOLUTION ON REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE OF NINE
TAGS: PFOR, NATO
To: STATE
SECDEF
Type: TE
Markings: Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 30 JUN 2005